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Abstract
This paper investigates the use of egalitarian criteria to select alloca-
tions in bankruptcy problems. In our work, we characterize the sets of
Lorenz maximal elements for these problems. We show that the allocation
selected by the Proportional Rule is the only allocation that belongs to
all these Lorenz maximal sets. We prove that the Talmud Rule selects the
lexicographic maximal element within a certain set. We introduce and
analyze a new sharing rule for bankruptcy problems that shares strong
similarities with the Talmud Rule.
Keywords: bankruptcy problems, Lorenz criterion and lexicographic
criterion.
1 Introduction
A bankruptcy problem consists of a set of claimants who must divide between
them an infinitely divisible good, the endowment, that is not sufficient to satisfy
their claims in full. The aim of this paper is to introduce egalitarian criteria to
solve bankruptcy problems.
The use of egalitarian criteria to select outcomes from a given set has been
widely analyzed in many different settings. For example, in the literature on
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coalitional games, is well-known that the most important solution concepts can
be seen as selectors of egalitarian optimal outcomes from a certain set1. We
focus on two egalitarian criteria: the Lorenz and lexicographic criteria.
In bankruptcy problems the Talmud Rule is one of the most important
sharing rules. This solution coincides with the nucleolus of the associated
bankruptcy games and the nucleolus can be seen as a solution that selects lexi-
cographic maximal elements in a certain set.
It has been noted by different authors that if we consider the set of feasible
allocations in a bankruptcy problem we need to conclude that the lexicographic
maximal allocation coincides with the allocation selected by the sharing rule
known as Constrained Equal Awards, a rule that seeks to give the same amount
to any claimant whenever that amount does not exceed her\his claim.2 Con-
strained Equal Losses (a rule that seeks to divide the loss equally whenever no
claimant receives a negative payoff) can also be seen as a lexicographic maxi-
mizer since it selects the lexicographic maximal allocation in the set of vectors
of losses. This paper proves that the Talmud Rule is also a lexicographic max-
imizer. It selects the lexicographic maximal allocation in the set of vectors of
awards/losses considered in absolute terms. This analysis allows the definition
of a new sharing rule, the Lexmax Rule. The new rule is based in the lexico-
graphic ideas and can be seen as a natural counterpart of the Talmud Rule.
A second major contribution of the paper is to characterize the sets of Lorenz
maximal vectors of awards/losses3. The existence of different Lorenz maximal
sets is due to the fact that the vectors of awards/losses can be weighted and can
be considered in real terms or absolute terms (See Subsection 2.3 for details).
If we consider the intersection of the weighted Lorenz sets in absolute terms we
find that it only contains the allocation provided by the Proportional Rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces bankruptcy
problems, sharing rules and egalitarian criteria. Section 3 deals with the differ-
ent Lorenz maximal sets, Section 4 is devoted to the lexicographic rules: the
Talmud Rule and the Lexmax Rule, and finally, Section 5 concludes.
1See for example Arin (2007).
2In Subsection 2.2 we introduce the two lexicographic criteria. The first criterion is based
in the minmax principle and the second one is based in the maxmin principle.
3In the literature on egalitarianism it is agreed that an allocation should be maximal
according to the Lorenz criterion as a minimal requirement for being called egalitarian. This
fact motivates the study of Lorenz maximal allocations for bankruptcy problems.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bankruptcy problems
The tuple (N, d,E) is a bankruptcy problem if:
a) N is a finite nonempty set.
b)
∑
i∈N
di > E.
N represents the set of agents or claimants, E ∈ R+ represents the amount
to be divided, and d ∈ RN+ is a vector of claims whose i-th component is di.
Then i  j means that we assume di ≤ dj and d1 ≥ 0. We denote by Γ the
class of bankruptcy problems.
An allocation to the claimants is represented by a real valued vector x ∈ RN
that satisfies
∑
i∈N xi = E. The i-th coordinate of the vector x denotes the
allocation given to claimant i.
We say that an allocation x satisfies claim boundedness and non negativity
if di ≥ xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
We denote by F (N, d,E) the set of allocations that satisfy claim boundedness
and non negativity.
A sharing rule φ in a set of problems Γ is a mapping that associates a vector
φ (N, d,E) ∈ F (N, d,E) with every problem (N, d,E) in Γ.
Some well-known sharing rules are4:
Constrained Equal Awards (CEA). This solution divides the endow-
ment equally among the agents under the constraint that no claimant receives
more than his\her claim. Formally:
CEA(N, d,E) = (min(β, di))i∈N
where β solves the equation
∑
i∈N min(β, di) = E.
Constrained Equal Losses (CEL). This solution divides the total loss
(
∑
i∈N
di − E) equally among the agents under the constraint that no claimant
receives a negative amount. Formally:
CEL(N, d,E) = (max(0, di − β))i∈N
and β solves the equation
∑
i∈N max(0, di − β) = E.
4A long list of rules can be found in a survey by Thomson (2003).
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TheProportional Rule (PR). This solution divides the endowment among
the claimants proportionally to their claims. Formally:
PR(N, d,E) = β · d
where β ≥ 0 and β · (
∑
i∈N di) = E.
Some convenient, well-known properties of a rule φ in Γ are the following.
• φ satisfies order preservation for awards and losses if for each (N, d,E)
in Γ we have that φ(N, d,E) is order preserving for awards and losses. An
allocation x is order preserving for awards and losses if di ≤ dj implies
that xi ≤ xj and di − xi ≤ dj − xj .
• φ satisfies consistency if for any problem (N, d,E) and any S ⊂ N it
holds that φi(S, (di)i∈S ,
∑
i∈S φi(N, d,E)) = φi(N, d,E) for all i ∈ S.
• φ satisfies half claim boundedness (HCB) if for any (N, d,E) ∈ Γ we
have that either φi(N, d,E) ≥
dl
2 for all i ∈ N or φi(N, d,E) ≤
dl
2 for all
i ∈ N .
• φ satisfies λ-claim boundedness (λ-CB) if for any (N, d,E) ∈ Γ we
have that either φi(N, d,E) ≥ λdl for all i ∈ N or φi(N, d,E) ≤ λdl for
all i ∈ N .
HCB is discussed in Aumann and Maschler (1985). This property is satisfied
by the Talmud Rule and by the Proportional Rule. The λ-CB is clearly inspired
by HCB and is satisfied by the Proportional Rule for any λ ∈ [0, 1] .
2.2 Egalitarian Criteria
For any vector z ∈ Rd we denote by θ(z) the vector that results from z by
permuting the coordinates in such a way that θ1(z) ≤ θ2(z) ≤ ... ≤ θd(z). Let
x, y ∈ Rd.
We say that the vector x Lorenz dominates the vector y (denoted by x ≻L y)
if
k∑
i=1
θi(x) ≥
k∑
i=1
θi(y) for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d} and if at least one of these inequal-
ities is strict. The vector x weakly Lorenz dominates the vector y (denoted by
x L y) if
k∑
i=1
θi(x) ≥
k∑
i=1
θi(y) for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}.
We say that the vector x lexicographically dominates the vector y (denoted
by x ≻lex y) if there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1}
and θk(x) > θk(y).
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This lexicographic criterion provides Lorenz maximal allocations.
We say that the vector x lexmax dominates the vector y (denoted by x ≻lm y)
if there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, ..., n} and
θk(x) < θk(y).
The lexmax criterion provides Lorenz maximal allocations.
The last two criteria can be considered lexicographic criteria. The first
one can be renamed as a maximin criterion and has been widely analyzed in
many different models. The second criterion, a minimax criterion is a natural
counterpart of the minimax criterion but has not received the same attention.
The maximin criterion is also known as the Rawlsian criterion.
2.3 The set of awards-losses vectors
Let (N, d,E) be a problem and let x be an allocation. Each agent measures xi
in two ways. In one sense xi measures how much he\she receives. In the other
sense, di−xi measures how much he\she does not receive. Given the allocation
x we define its associated ordered vector of awards-losses as follows:
xAL = (x1, ..., xn, x1 − d1, ..., xn − dn).
We also use the following notation:
xA = (x1, ..., xn) and x
L = (x1 − d1, ..., xn − dn).
In this vector, awards and losses are equally weighted and equally treated.
We also consider vectors where awards and losses are not equally treated. Given
the allocation x we define its associated weighted vector of awards-losses as
follows:
λ-xAL = ((1− λ)x1, ..., (1− λ)xn, λ(x1 − d1), ..., λ(xn − dn))
where λ ∈ [0, 1] . Note that λ-xAL with λ = 12 is the vector of equal weights,
which in our study is equivalent to considering xAL or λ-xAL with λ = 12 . The
following set
|λ-AL(N, d,E)| =
{∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ : x ∈ F (N, d,E)}
is the set of vectors of awards-losses taken in absolute terms. Note that
we use the notation λ-xAL instead of λ-xAL(N, d,E). We consider there is no
confusion, so we prefer the notation λ-xAL for the sake of simplicity.
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3 The Lorenz criterion
The first egalitarian criterion we consider is the Lorenz criterion. The Lorenz
order is not complete and therefore by applying this criterion we do not, in
general, obtain uniqueness. In this sense, the set of Lorenz maximal allocations
(the set of Lorenz undominated allocations) can be seen as the maximal set of
fair allocations. A Lorenz dominated allocation is not a candidate for selection
when looking for fair allocations. The set of Lorenz undominated allocations is
defined as follows:
L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that yAL ≻L x
AL
}
.
The Lorenz maximal set coincides with the set of allocations that satisfy
order preservation in both ways, awards and losses Theorem 1). Therefore,
order preservation emerges as a minimal requirement for a fair allocation.
The proof of this result relies on the following fact. For two elements k and
l, a vector x, and a real number α > 0, we say that (k, l, x, α) is an equalizing
bilateral transfer (of size α from k to l with respect to x) if
xk − α ≥ xl + α.
Now, Lemma 2 of Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952) implies that an allo-
cation y Lorenz dominates another allocation x only if y can be obtained from
x by a finite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers.
Theorem 1 The Lorenz maximal set coincides with the set of all allocations
that satisfy order preservation in both ways: awards and losses.
Proof. Let x ∈ F (N, d,E) be such that x is not order preserving for awards.
Therefore, there are claimants i, j such that di ≥ dj and xi < xj. Then it also
holds that di − xi > dj − xj . Consider the following allocation z :
zl =


xl + ε if l = i
xl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε = min(
xj−xi
2 ,
(di−xi)−(dj−xj)
2 ).
It is not difficult to check that zAL ≻L x
AL since it still holds that zi ≤ zj
and di − zi ≥ dj − zj . The proof is similar in the case where x violates order
preservation for losses.
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Let x be an allocation satisfying order preservation for awards and losses.
Then ∑
1≤i≤n
θi(x
AL) = E −
∑
1≤i≤n
di
since the first n elements of the vector θ(xAL) are the ordered losses (xn −
dn, ..., x1 − d1)
5. Note also that
2n∑
i=n+1
θi(x
AL) =
∑
1≤i≤n
xi = E
since the last n elements of the vector θ(xAL) are the ordered awards (x1, ..., xn).
Therefore, if there is an allocation z such that zAL ≻L x
AL should be the case
that zL ≻L x
L and zA L x
A or zL L x
L and zA ≻L x
A. If zA ≻L x
A then zA
can be obtained from xA by a finite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers.
Now consider a vector yA resulting from xA after a bilateral equalizing
transfer. Let i, j two claimants such that xi < xj
yl =


xl + ε if l = i
xl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where 0 < ε ≤
xj−xi
2 .
It is clear that yA ≻L x
A implies that xL ≻L y
L and therefore yAL does not
Lorenz dominate xAL.
A similar consideration follows for the case where we consider Lorenz domi-
nation with respect to the vector xL. That is, if there exists an allocation y such
that yL ≻L x
L then xA ≻L y
A and therefore yAL does not Lorenz dominate
xAL.
Figure 1 shows the Lorenz maximal set when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
As we know by theorem 1, figure 1 also is representing the set of all allocations
that satisfy order preservation in awards and losses when E moves from 0 to
d1 + d2.
The following corollary arises immediately since a convex combination of
order preserving allocations is also order preserving.
Corollary 2 The Lorenz maximal set is convex.
5If there is any x1 < (xi − di) we have the following contradiction:
x1 < (xi − di) ≤ (x1 − d1) < x1.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Lorenz maximal set when E moves from 0 to
d1 + d2.
Note that if an allocation x is order preserving in (N, d,E) then (xi)i∈S
is also order preserving in (S, (di)i∈S ,
∑
i∈S xi) and therefore the Lorenz set
satisfies the consistency principle.
Corollary 3 Let x ∈ L(N, d,E). Then (xi)i∈S ∈ L(S, (di)i∈S ,
∑
i∈S xi).
We also define the weighted Lorenz maximal set for λ ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
λ− L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that λ-yAL ≻L λ-x
AL
}
.
A direct consequence of the proof of Theorem 1 is that for λ ∈ (0, 1) the
weighted Lorenz maximal sets coincide. This is so because whenever λ ∈ (0, 1) it
is still true that
∑
1≤i≤n θi(λ-x
AL) = λ(E−
∑
1≤i≤n di) and
∑
n+1≤i≤2n θi(λ −
xAL) = (1− λ)E. Therefore the arguments of the proof can be repeated.
However it is immediately apparent that if we take λ = 0
L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that y ≻L x
}
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coincides with CEA(N, d,E) and if we take λ = 1 the set
L(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that yL ≻L x
L
}
coincides with CEL(N, d,E).
The last two results were noted by Bosmans et al. (2007) when study-
ing Lorenz comparisons between vectors of n elements (being n the number of
claimants). Many other authors have considered Lorenz comparisons of vectors
of n elements in their works. For example, this type of analysis can be found in
Thomson (2007).
This analysis points out a natural question: If we consider the vector of
awards-losses in absolute terms does the new Lorenz set coincide with the set
of allocations that satisfy order preservation in both ways? The answer is not.
We define the new Lorenz maximal set as a set of Lorenz undominated
allocations in the following terms:
LAT (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that
∣∣yAL∣∣ ≻L ∣∣xAL∣∣
}
.
The new set is a subset of the Lorenz set defined above.
Theorem 4 The set LAT (N, d,E) coincides with the set of all allocations that
satisfy half claim boundedness and order preservation in both ways: awards and
losses.
Proof. Let x ∈ F (N, d,E) be such that x is not order preserving for awards.
Therefore, there are claimants i, j such that di ≥ dj and xi < xj. Then it also
holds that di − xi > dj − xj . Consider the following allocation z :
zl =


xl + ε if l = i
xl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε = min(
xj−xi
2 ,
(di−xi)−(dj−xj)
2 ).
It is not difficult to check that
∣∣zAL∣∣ ≻L ∣∣xAL∣∣ since it still holds that zi ≤ zj
and di − zi ≥ dj − zj . The proof is similar in the case where x violates order
preservation for losses.
Let x ∈ F (N, d,E) be such that x does not satisfy HCB. Therefore, there are
claimants i, j such that xi <
di
2 and xj >
dj
2 . Then it also holds that di−xi > xi
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and xj > dj − xj . Consider the following allocation z :
zl =


xl + ε if l = i
xl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε is such that still holds that di − zi ≥ zi and zj ≥ dj − zj .
It is not difficult to check that
∣∣zAL∣∣ ≻L ∣∣xAL∣∣ .
Assume that E ≤ 12
∑
i∈N
di and let x be an allocation satisfying HCB and
order preservation in both ways. For any two claimants i, j (assuming dl ≤ dj)
it holds that (by HCB of x) di − xi ≥ xi and dj − xj ≥ xj . Since x also satisfies
order preservation it also holds that xj ≥ xi and dj − xj ≥ dl − xl.
Therefore we conclude that xi is the minimum among the four numbers
while dj − xj is the maximum. Assume that allocation z results from a bilat-
eral transfer made by claimant i to claimant j. That implies that zi < xi and
therefore
∣∣zAL∣∣ cannot Lorenz dominate ∣∣xAL∣∣ . Assume that allocation z results
from a bilateral transfer made by claimant j to claimant i. That implies that
dj−zj > dj −xj and therefore
∣∣zAL∣∣ cannot Lorenz dominate ∣∣xAL∣∣ . The proof
is almost identical if we consider E > 12
∑
i∈N
di. Therefore there is no bilateral
transfer between claimants allowing a new allocation that can be used to claim
that x is not an element of the set LAT (N, d,E).
Figure 2 illustrates the set LAT (N, d,E) in two-claimant problems when
E moves from 0 to d1 + d2 which coincides with the set of allocations that
satisfy HCB. Figure 2(a) shows the set of allocations that satisfy HCB when
d2
2 < d2 − d1, and similarly, figure 2(b) shows the set of allocations that satisfy
HCB when d22 > d2 − d1.
Following almost identical arguments as in Theorem 4, the following theorem
can be proved.
Theorem 5 The set λ-LAT (N, d,E) coincides with the set of all allocations
that satisfy λ-claim boundedness and order preservation in both ways: awards
and losses.
The set λ-LAT (N, d,E) is defined as follows:
λ-LAT (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E); there is no y ∈ F (N, d,E)
such that
∣∣λ− yAL∣∣ ≻L ∣∣λ− xAL∣∣
}
.
Since the Proportional Rule is the only sharing rule satisfying λ-CB for any
λ ∈ (0, 1) the following corollary is immediate.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the set LAT (N, d,E) in two-claimant problems when E
moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
Corollary 6 ∩
λ∈(0,1)
λ-LAT (N, d,E) = {PR(N, d,E)} .
Proof. Let (N,E, d) be a bankruptcy problem and let λ = EP
n≥l≥1 dl
. Then
E = λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl and therefore λ-L(N, d,E) = {λd} = {PR(N, d,E)} .
The Proportional Rule is the only rule that selects Lorenz maximal outcomes
for any problem whenever awards and losses are simultaneously considered6.
4 The Lexicographic criterion
4.1 The Maximin Principle
A central rule in the literature of bankruptcy problems is the Talmud Rule in-
troduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985). This rule explains the resolution of
three numerical examples that can be found in the Talmud. For many years was
an open problem what rule was behind these examples. Aumann and Maschler
prove that their rule prescribes the proposals of the examples in the Talmud.
6Note that if we only consider awards or losses the only allocation that is Lorenz maximal
is the CEA allocation or the CEL allocation.
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They also prove that the rule coincides with the nucleolus of a TU game associ-
ated with the bankruptcy problem. Given a bankrupycy problem (N, d,E) we
define its associated bankruptcy game as a TU game (N, v) where N is the set
of claimants and v(S) = max
{
E −
∑
l/∈S dl, 0
}
. See O
,
Neill (1982).
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) selects lexicographical maximal elements
in the set of vectors of satisfactions of the coalitions. We prove that the Talmud
Rule is also a Lexicographic rule. First we introduce the definition of the Talmud
Rule.
Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then
Ti(N, d,E) =
{
min
{
di
2 , α
}
if E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2
di
2 +max
{
di
2 − α, 0
}
otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 Ti(N, d,E) = E.
This rule provides the allocation whose vector of awards-losses is the lexico-
graphically maximal vector in the set |AL (N, d,E)| . That is,
Theorem 7 Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then
T (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E);
∣∣xAL∣∣ ≻lex ∣∣yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
Proof. Let z = T (N, d,E). We distinguish 4 cases:
a) E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zi <
di
2 for all i ∈ N.
Then the first n elements of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (En , ..., En ) and clearly∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates any other vector ∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is an alloca-
tion.
b) E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zl =
di
2 for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} . Then the first 2k elements
of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (d12 , d12 , ...., dk2 , dk2 ) and the next (n − k) elements
are (
E− 1
2
P
k≥l≥1 dl
n−k , ...,
E− 1
2
P
k≥l≥1 dl
n−k ). Clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates
any other vector
∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is an allocation.
c) E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and di > zi >
di
2 for all i ∈ N. Then the first n elements
of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (Pn≥l≥1 dl−En , ...,
P
n≥l≥1 dl−E
n ) and clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lex-
icographically dominates any other vector
∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is an allocation.
d) E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zl =
di
2 for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} . Then the first 2k elements
of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (d12 , d12 , ...., dk2 , dk2 ) and the next (n− k) elements are
(
1
2
∑
n≥l≥k+1 dl −
1
2E
n− k
, ...,
1
2
∑
n≥l≥k+1 dl −
1
2E
n− k
).
Clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates any other vector ∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is
an allocation.
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Weighted Talmud Rules7 are introduced and studied by Moreno-Ternero and
Villar (2006). They call this family of rules the TAL-family.
Let (N, d,E) be a problem. Then
λ-Ti(N, d,E) =
{
min {λdi, α} if E ≤ λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
λdi +max {(1− λ)di − α, 0} otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 λ-Ti(N, d,E) = E.
It is not difficult to check that this rule provides the allocation whose vector
of awards-losses is maximal in the set
∣∣ALλ(I (N, d,E))∣∣ . That is for λ ∈ (0, 1)
we have that
λ-T (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E);
∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ Lex ∣∣λ-yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
Given a bankruptcy problem (N, d,E) and λ = EP
n≥l≥1 dl
it holds that E =
λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl and therefore λ-Ti(N, d,E) = λdi. This fact is the proof of the
following corollary.
Corollary 8 Let (N, d,E) be a problem where E = λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl. Then λ-
T ((N, d,E)) = PR((N, d,E)).
Aumann and Maschler (1985) characterize the Talmud Rule as the unique
consistent rule for bankruptcy problems (Theorem A). In their work consistency
is also called CG-consistency and explained as follows:
Intuitively, a solution is consistent if any two claimants i,j use
the contested garment principle to divide between them the total
amount xi + xj awarded to them by the solution.
The contested garment principle is a solution used to solve two-claimant
problems. The solution coincides with the Talmud Rule and the theorem can be
interpreted as follows; the Talmud Rule is the unique solution that consistently
extends to n claimant problems the contested garment principle.
Replacing the contested garment principle by the solution prescribed by
a Weighted Talmud Rule in two claimant problems we can characterize this
Weighted Talmud Rule as the unique rule that consistently extends to n claimant
problems this solution prescribed for two claimant problems.
7The term Weighted Talmud Rule is introduced by Hokari and Thomson (2003). In their
case the weights refer to the claimants and not to awards\losses. We keep the term since we
think there is no confusion and it is more consistent with the rest of the paper.
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4.2 The Minimax Principle
This interpretation of the Talmud Rule, as a rule based in a lexicographic max-
imin criterion, suggests the definition of a new rule based on the lexmax (lexico-
graphic minimax) criterion. In the literature of TU games this criterion inspires
the definition of the Lexmax rule and the antinucleolus (see Arin (2007)). See
also Luss (1999) for the application of the minimax principle in other models.
We call the new rule Lexmax Rule, and we denote it by LM, formally,
Definition 9 Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then LM(N, d,E) ={
x ∈ F (N, d,E);
∣∣xAL∣∣ ≻lm ∣∣yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
This rule satisfies order preservation (in both ways) and HCB since it pro-
vides allocations that belong to the set LAT (N, d,E). It is also quite immedi-
ately apparent that the new rule satisfies consistency.
The three facts can be used to define the following algorithm in order to
compute the Lexmax Rule of a bankruptcy problem.
A procedure for computing the Lexmax Rule of a bankruptcy
problem
Let (N, d,E) be a problem. In order to obtain LM((N, d,E)) consider the
following 4 cases:
a) Let E <
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 < dn − CELn(N, d,E). Then
LM(N, d,E) = CEL(N, d,E).
b) Let E <
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 ≥ dn − CELn(N, d,E). Then
LMn(N, d,E) =
dn
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−1 = (N\ {n} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−1}, E −
dn
2 ). If
dn−1
2 < dn−1 − CELn−1(An−1)
then
LM(An−1) = CEL(An−1).
If dn−12 ≥ dn−1 − CELn−1(An−1) then
LMn−1(An−1) =
dn − 1
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−2 = (N\ {n, n− 1} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−2}, E −
dn
2 −
dn−1
2 ) and continue with this
procedure until an allocation for all claimants is obtained.
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c) Let E ≥
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 < dn − CEAn(N, d,E). Then
LM(N, d,E) = CEA(N, d,E).
d) Let E ≥
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and
dn
2 ≥ dn − CEAn(N, d,E). Then
LMn(N, d,E) =
dn
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−1 = (N\ {n} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−1}, E −
dn
2 ). If
dn−1
2 < dn−1 − CEAn−1(An−1)
then
LM(An−1) = CEA(An−1).
If dn−12 ≥ dn−1 − CELn−1(An−1) then
LMn−1(An−1) =
dn − 1
2
.
To obtain the allocation for the rest of the claimants consider the problem
An−2 = (N\ {n, n− 1} , (di)i∈{1,...,n−2}, E −
dn
2 −
dn−1
2 ) and continue with this
procedure until an allocation for all claimants is obtained.
In case a) CEL satisfies HCB and losses are higher than awards. In case b)
CEL of the original problem violates HCB and therefore we fix the allocation
of claimant n in order to preserve HCB. The consistency of the Lexmax Rule
allows us to seek the allocation of the rest of the claimants in a new reduced
problem where again losses are higher than awards. If in the new case CEL
satisfies HCB this is the allocation for the rest of the claimants and otherwise
we fix the allocation of claimant n − 1 and we continue with a new reduced
problem where again losses are higher than awards.
Cases c) and d) are the reverse of cases a and b when awards are higher than
losses and the reference is CEA instead of CEL.
Figure 3 illustrates how these rules perform in two-claimant problems when
E moves from 0 to d1 + d2. Figure 3(a) shows the Lexmax Rule when
d2
2 ≤
(d2 − d1). Similarly, figure 3(b) shows the case
d2
2 > (d2 − d1).
Similarly, given a bankruptcy problem (N, d,E), the λ-Lexmax Rules are
defined as follows:
λ-LM(N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ F (N, d,E);
∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ ≻lm ∣∣λ-yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ F (N, d,E)} .
The computation of the Weighted Lexmax Rules results from replacing the
parameter 12 by λ in the procedure above. The procedure can be used to provide
15
d1 x1
x2
d2
d2
2
d1 x1
x2
d2
(d2 − d1)
d2
2
d1
2
CEL
Lexmax
CEA
2(a) LM when d22 ≤ d2 − d1 2(b) LM when
d2
2 > d2 − d1
Figure 3: Illustration of the Lexmax Rule when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
the following alternative definition of the Lexmax Rule that shares similarities
with the definition of the Talmud Rule.
We introduce the definition of the Talmud Rule.
Let (N, d,E) be a bankruptcy problem. Then
LMi(N, d,E) =
{
max
{
min
{
di
2 , di − α
}
, 0
}
if E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2
min
{
max
{
α, di2
}
, di
}
otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 Ti(N, d,E) = E.
If the Estate is less than half of the total claims the Talmud Rule provides
the CEA allocation whenever this allocation satisfies HCB (See Chun et al.
(2001)). In the other case the Talmud Rule assigns the CEL allocation whenever
this allocation satisfies HCB. The Lexmax Rule replaces CEA by CEL in the
first case and CEL by CEA in the second case. Therefore the Lexmax Rule
is a natural counterpart of the Talmud Rule. The following table represents
different bankruptcy problems all of them with the same set of claimants and
claims ((100, 200, 300)).
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ETalmud
Awards
Lexmax
Awards
Talmud
Losses
Lexmax
Losses
100 (33 13 , 33
1
3 , 33
1
3 ) (0, 0, 100) (66
2
3 , 166
2
3 , 266
2
3 ) (100, 200, 200)
200 (50, 75, 75) (0, 50, 150) (50, 125, 225) (100, 150, 150)
300 (50, 100, 150) (50, 100, 150) (50, 100, 150) (50, 100, 150)
400 (50, 125, 225) (100, 150, 150) (50, 75, 75) (0, 50, 150)
500 (66 23 , 166
2
3 , 266
2
3 ) (100, 200, 200) (33
1
3 , 33
1
3 , 33
1
3 ) (0, 0, 100)
The first three problems, mentioned in the Talmud, motivate the paper by
Aumann and Maschler (1985).
Note that if E <
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then T (N, d,E) ≻L LM(N, d,E).
If E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then LM(N, d,E) ≻L T (N, d,E). The situation is reversed
if we compare losses, that is, if E <
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then (d− LM(N, d,E)) ≻L (d−
T (N, d,E)) and if E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 then (d− T (N, d,E)) ≻L (d− LM(N, d,E)).
Finally, we add that in the literature of bankruptcy problems the Reverse
Talmus Rulw has been defined.
The Reverse Talmud Rule is defined as follows:
RTi(N, d,E) =
{
max
{
di
2 − α, 0
}
if E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2
di
2 +min
{
di
2 , α
}
otherwise
Arin and Benito (2010) show that the Reverse Talmud Rule is a Least Square
value. The Talmud Rule allows two different interpretations:
1.- If E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule provides the CEA allocation whenever the
allocation satisfies HCB. If E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule provides the CEL allocation
whomever the allocation satisfies HCB.
2.- If E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule provides the CEA allocation of a new problem
where the claims are half of the original claims. If E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 the rule
provides to each claimant half of his\her claim plus the CEL allocation of a new
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problem where the claims are half of the original claims and the Estate results
E −
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 .
Replacing CEA by CEL and CEL by CEA the first interpretation provides
the Lexmax rule. In the second interpretation the same replacement originates
the Reverse Talmud rule.
5 Conclusions
This research can be summarized with the table below. In the table rules are
linked with egalitarian criteria and sets and can be interpreted as answers to
the following two questions:
1. What egalitarian criterion is used to make egalitarian comparisons be-
tween elements?
2. From what set are those elements taken?
Rule Criterion Set Weight : λ
CEA Lex and Lexmax A(N, d,E)
CEL Lex and Lexmax L(N, d,E)
LM lexmax |λ-AL(N, d,E)| 12
T Lex |λ-AL(N, d,E)| 12
λ-T Lex |λ-AL(N, d,E)| λ
PR Lexmax and Lex |λ-AL(N, d,E)| EP
n≥l≥1 dl
The table gives a unified framework to place many different rules that have
been introduced and analyzed by several authors.
The table8 also indicates how to extend this type of solutions to other differ-
ent settings. In particular, in airport problems (Littlechild, 1974) it is generally
8The Reverse Talmud rule and its associated Reverse λ-Talmud rules also solve the same
questions. The egalitarian criterion used to generate the rules is the Least Square criterion.
See Arin and Benito /2010) for details.
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accepted that solutions must select core allocations and not merely imputations.
Therefore, the search for egalitarian maximal elements should be restricted to
the core of the airport problem. In other settings, other constraints may ex-
ist and solutions are required to satisfy them. This is a restriction of the set
where egalitarian maximal elements are sought. Also in claim problems different
constraints could be considered.
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